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CONTINUING SEIZURE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
CONCEPTUAL DISCORD AND EVIDENTIARY
UNCERTAINTY IN UNITED STATES v. DUPREE
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint and interference . unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law."-Horace Gray'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Justice Horace Gray articulated the paramount importance of
Fourth Amendment protections in 1891, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently recognized the significance of protecting individual rights in the ar-
eas of search and seizure.2 Though subsequent Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has reaffirmed Justice Gray's sentiment, the meaning of
"clear and unquestionable authority of law" has evolved based on the need
to balance individual rights against the practical necessities of effective law
enforcement.3 The Supreme Court's holdings in Teny v. Ohio,4 and later
in United States v. Mendenhall,5 Floida v. Royer,@ and Michigan v. Chesternut,7
provided clarity in assessing this balance by developing standards for de-
termining the reasonableness of a seizure.8 Specifically, the Court defined
1. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (Gray, J.).
2. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 12-13 (1968) (quoting Justice Gray's pro-
nouncement of Fourth Amendment importance and noting exclusionary rule de-
veloped to deter police misconduct and protect individual rights).
If [unconstitutionally seized] letters and private documents can . . . be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an of-
fense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment . .. is of no value ....
The efforts of courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment
... are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles estab-
lished by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
3. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (holding police officers may "stop and frisk" indi-
viduals suspected of criminal activity on less than probable cause where articulable
facts are present to aid in effective law enforcement); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Marvel or Mischiejl, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 911, 918
(1998) (examining unprecedented nature of Terry decision and discussing Court's
determination of need for greater flexibility than probable cause standard for law
enforcement provided).
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
6. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).
7. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
8. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (defining test for seizure as "whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"). In United
States v. Mendenhall the Court identified the following seizure standard:
(235)
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seizure of the person to occur when, based on the "totality of the circum-
stances," a reasonable person would believe he or she is no longer free to
terminate the encounter and leave.9 This standard was significantly al-
tered, however, in the 1991 case California v. Hodari D.,1 0 in which the
Court held that seizure occurs only when an individual is subject to physi-
cal force or a show of authority and that person yields to such force or
authority."1
Commentators have discussed Hodari extensively in the context of
how the decision impacted Fourth Amendment standards defining what
constitutes a seizure.' 2 Absent from such discussion, however, is meaning-
We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only when, by means of
physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is re-
strained. . . . As long as the person to whom questions are put remains
free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intru-
sion upon the person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution
require some particularized and objective justification.
446 U.S. at 553-54 (plurality opinion); see also Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574 (affirming
Mendenhall standard and explaining "[t] he test's objective standard . .. allows the
police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate
the Fourth Amendment [and] ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being ap-
proached"); Royer, 460 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion) (holding that seizure
occurred where police asked suspect to accompany them to police room while
retaining his identification and plane tickets because "a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave"); Richard A. Williamson, The Dimen-
sions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 771, 772-73
(1982) (identifying Supreme Court's efforts since 1970s to effectively define
seizure and reconcile individual rights with need for effective police investigations,
though noting greater specificity is needed).
9. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (plurality opinion) (clarifying standard for
seizure as when "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave").
10. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
11. See id. at 626 (concluding "reasonable person" seizure test is appropriate
in determining whether show of authority occurred, but not dispositive in seizure
analysis where common law arrest standards guide). In defining seizure, the
Hodari Court stipulated that "with respect to a show of authority as with respect to
application of physical force," a seizure does not occur when the subject has not
yielded; rather, a seizure occurs through the application of physical force or an
individual's submission to law enforcement show of authority. See id. (providing
central holding of what constitutes seizure based on common law arrest
standards).
12. See, e.g., Juan F. Alanis, To Seize or Not to Seize . 23 AM. J. CRIm. L. 461,
470 (1996) (examining standard developed in Hodari and noting that based on its
evidentiary implications, states declined adopting decision in favor of reasonable
person standard); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should
Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REv. 895, 927 (2002) (analyz-
ing Fourth Amendment search and seizure law but identifying Hodari only in refer-
ence to decision's reliance on common law understandings of seizure and arrest);
Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court's
Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1387, 1406 (2003) (analyzing Hodari
through lens of judicial use of common law in reconstructing narrow definition of
seizure but not identifying circuit split or interpretation of continuing seizure);
Brian D. Walsh, Illinois v. Wardlow: High-Crime Areas, Fight, and the Fourth Amend-
236 [Vol. 55: p. 235
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ful analysis of how Hodari has complicated lower courts' task of assessing
the point at which a seizure occurs in the following scenario: an individual
is initially subject to physical force or a show of authority and that person
momentarily yields, but then subsequently resists or breaks free from po-
lice before eventually being subdued.' 3 Hodari offers conflicting guidance
on this question of whether an individual is considered seized during the
momentary submission and "continually seized" throughout the encoun-
ter, or seized only once ultimately apprehended.14 Consequently, this
question has long divided federal courts of appeal.15
The circuit split on the issue of "continuing seizure"-whether an in-
dividual has been "seized" before breaking free, and whether such seizure
is deemed "continuous"-has tremendous implications for the application
of the exclusionary rule.' 6 Specifically, Terry dictates that seizures of the
person must be accompanied by reasonable suspicion for evidence ob-
ment, 54 ARK. L. REv. 879, 914 (2002) (criticizing Hodari holding as allowing con-
tinuing seizure and threatening Fourth Amendment individual rights protections,
particularly in high-crime areas, though not referencing circuit decisions dis-
missing concept of continuing seizure).
13. For further discussion of how courts determine the moment when seizure
occurs, see infra notes 14, 19-23, and accompanying text.
14. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626 (stating that "[t]he narrow question before us
is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of
physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold
that it does not."). But cf id. (stating that "[t]he word 'seizure' readily bears the
meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain move-
ment, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful. . . . An arrest requires either physical
force (as described above) or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of
authority").
15. Compare United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing suspect not seized when he "halt[s] temporarily" in response to show of au-
thority through order to stop, but then flees), United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d
762, 768 (7th Cir. 1999) (defining seizure as sum of two parts: (1) "the arresting
officer must apply physical force or display a show of authority"; and (2) "the physi-
cal force or show of authority must cause the fleeing subject to stop"), United
States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to adopt rule
that suspect was seized when he paused momentarily on show of authority and was
touched by police officer but subsequently fled), and United States v. Washington,
12 F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding defendant was not seized when
he momentarily complied with order to pull car over to side of road but then sped
away before officers approached despite defendant's momentary submission to au-
thority), with United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting
seizure occurs even if application of physical force is unsuccessful and concluding
that momentary compliance with show of authority constitutes arrest despite subse-
quent resistance or struggle), United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir.
1993) (concluding suspect was seized by initial compliance with show of authority
even though suspect ran from police when opportunity was presented), and
United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that "since
the defendant, at least momentarily, yielded to [the officer's] apparent show of au-
thority ... [defendant] was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment during
the initial portion of the encounter" despite his flight after momentary
submission).
16. For further discussion of the circuit split over whether Hodari endorses or
rejects the concept of continuing seizure, and how this circuit split results in diver-
2372010] NorE
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tained during the seizure to be deemed admissible.1 7 Conversely, seizures
conducted absent reasonable suspicion violate the Fourth Amendment
and render evidence obtained inadmissible pursuant to exclusionary rule
protections.1 8 Seizures generally fall within one of four categories: (1)
seizure by physical force that subdues the suspect; (2) seizure by show of
authority to which the suspect submits; (3) seizure by physical force from
which the suspect breaks away before being ultimately apprehended; and
(4) seizure by show of authority to which the suspect momentarily submits
prior to flight and before being apprehended.' 9 In the former two catego-
ries, the seizure is a static event, and it is settled that evidence obtained
during the encounter is admissible only if reasonable suspicion was pre-
sent at the outset of the seizure. 20 In the latter two categories, however,
the admissibility of any evidence obtained hinges upon whether a court
recognizes the concept of continuing seizure. 21 If a court recognizes a
continuing seizure, then a suspect is seized at the outset and throughout
the encounter, and the evidence obtained is inadmissible unless reasona-
ble suspicion existed at the outset.22 On the other hand, if a court rejects
the concept of a continuing seizure, then a suspect is seized only once
ultimately subdued and apprehended, and evidence obtained prior to the
suspect's apprehension is admissible regardless of whether reasonable sus-
gent applications of the exclusionary rule, see infra notes 81-116 and accompany-
ing text.
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (explaining that evidence ob-
tained from seizure of person is inadmissible under exclusionary rule only if there
was not reasonable suspicion to conduct seizure). For further discussion of the
test for determining reasonable suspicion, see infra notes 40-41 and accompanying
text.
18. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (explaining that seizures of person without reason-
able suspicion render evidence obtained from seizure inadmissible under exclu-
sionary rule). For further discussion of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
protections, see infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626 (stating that "[t]he word 'seizure' readily
bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to re-
strain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.... An arrest requires
either physical force or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of author-
ity"); Baldwin, 496 F.3d at 218 (describing seizure scenario where suspect "halt[s]
temporarily" in response to show of authority through order to stop then flees);
Bradley, 196 F.3d at 768 (explaining that seizure occurs when application of physi-
cal force and/or show of authority causes suspect to stop).
20. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624-25 (concluding that seizure by physical force or
show of authority requires suspect to yield and noting that evidence discarded pur-
suant to seizure without reasonable suspicion renders evidence inadmissible).
21. See United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting
that ascertaining "the timing of the seizure is significant" to determining whether
evidence is inadmissible under exclusionary rule).
22. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 29 (explaining that evidence obtained during seizure
of person is inadmissible under exclusionary rule absent reasonable suspicion at
outset of seizure). For further discussion of those circuits that interpret Hodari to
endorse the concept of continuing seizure, and the resulting exclusionary rule
implications, see infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
238 [Vol. 55: p. 235
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picion existed at that time.2 3 Thus, the circuit split over whether Hodari
endorses or rejects the concept of continuing seizure has resulted in diver-
gent applications of the exclusionary rule, and questions abound as to
whether interpreting Hodari as rejecting continuing seizure thwarts or re-
inforces exclusionary rule principles. 24
Although the circuit split surrounding continuing seizure emerged in
the mid-1990s following Hodari,25 the issue recently re-emerged in the dis-
trict court case of United States v. Dupree.2 6 Relying on Third Circuit prece-
dent, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
applied the Third Circuit's concept of continuing seizure, and in so doing,
further cemented the federal divide. 27 This Note discusses the develop-
ment of Fourth Amendment continuing seizure jurisprudence and con-
cludes that although Dupree supports the individual rights concerns
underlying the exclusionary rule, it is inconsistent with the Supreme
23. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (explaining that evidence obtained during seizure
of person is admissible when reasonable suspicion for seizure existed at outset of
seizure). For further discussion of those circuits that interpret Hodari to reject the
concept of continuing seizure, and the resulting exclusionary rule implications,
see infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
24. See United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 572-73 (2d Cir. 2005) (consid-
ering whether evidence obtained in continuing seizure scenario is inadmissible
given policies underlying exclusionary rule). Specifically, the court in Swindle
stated:
A substantial argument could be made that a broader definition of
"seizure"-or some other remedy-is required to adequately protect
Fourth Amendment values from harms flowing from police initiation of
Terry stops without reasonable suspicion. Although the Hodari D. Court
stated that "only a few of those orders [to stop], we must presume, will be
without adequate basis," the possibility that unreasonable orders are in-
frequent does not necessarily make them acceptable. Even if the kind of
order given in Swindle's case is rare-and we do not suggest that it is-we
see no persuasive reason for the law to tolerate it. In view of what we
believe to be the controlling cases, however, we must affirm a conviction
that was achieved with evidence obtained by an abuse of police power. A
remedy for Swindle's Fourth Amendment complaint can come only from
a higher authority.
Id. at 573 (internal citation omitted). Ultimately, the court concluded that Hodari
rejected the concept of continuing seizure, and accordingly held the evidence ob-
tained prior to the defendant's apprehension to be admissible. See id. ("As we are
compelled to hold that Swindle was seized only when the police physically appre-
hended him-at which time the officers had probable cause for an arrest-we
must conclude that the drugs Swindle discarded prior to his apprehension were
not the fruit of a Fourth Amendment seizure.").
25. For citation to cases comprising the circuit split, see supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
26. Crim. No. 08-280, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4,
2009).
27. See id. at *8 (holding that suspect physically grabbed by police officers for
two seconds prior to breaking away and fleeing was seized at initial touching based
on Third Circuit precedent stating "when a seizure is effected by even 'the slightest
application of physical force,' it is immaterial whether the suspect yields to that
force" (citing United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006))).
5
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Court's Fourth Amendment precedent, Hodari, and prevailing interpreta-
tions of continuing seizure since 1991.28 Part II of this Note examines the
legal landscape of Fourth Amendment seizure law prior to Hodari and ex-
plains Hodari's impact in this area.29 Part III discusses federal courts' in-
terpretations of Hodari with respect to continuing seizure and articulates
these courts' respective rationales.3 0 Part IV details the facts and the dis-
trict court's reasoning in Dupree, and discusses the Third Circuit's existing
approach to continuing seizure on which the district court relied.3 1 Part V
argues that the holding in Dupree is inconsistent with both Fourth Amend-
ment case law in general and Hodari in particular.32 Finally, Part VI evalu-
ates Dupree's potential impact on the existing circuit split, and given the
need for evidentiary uniformity under federal law, argues that the Third
Circuit should reverse the district court's holding in Dupree.33
II. CONTINUALLY SEARCHING FOR CLARITY: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIzURE LAW
Formulated in the post-American Revolution milieu, the Fourth
Amendment was adopted to affirm a constitutional commitment to gov-
ernment restraint in the areas of search and seizure.34 Yet, as one com-
mentator notes, the Amendment is "famously short on specifics" and,
consequently, the breadth and scope of its parameters have been subject
to ongoing Supreme Court interpretation.3 5 In the context of defining
28. For a discussion of Dupree's inconsistency with Fourth Amendment case
law and holdings post-Hodari, see infra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of Fourth Amendment case law prior to Hodari and an
examination of Hodad's impact on seizure law, see infra notes 34-80 and accompa-
nying text.
30. For a discussion of federal courts' interpretation of Hodari in the context
of whether that decision supports the continuing seizure concept, see infra notes
81-116 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Dupree, see infra notes 117-35
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's prevailing ap-
proach to continuing seizure cases, on which the district court in Dupree relied, see
infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of how the Dupree holding and the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of continuing seizure departs from case law since Hodari, see infra notes
150-75 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of Dupree's impact, see infra notes 177-86 and accompany-
ing text.
34. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical
Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 939-40 (1997) (noting Fourth Amendment was formu-
lated in response to abuses suffered by American colonists at hands of British
soldiers during American Revolution and adopted to curb government intrusion).
35. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM.
L. REv. 1739, 1739 (2000) (stating that ambiguity in text of Fourth Amendment
has required judicial interpretation by Supreme Court); see also Maclin, supra note
34, at 927 (noting Supreme Court holdings in Fourth Amendment cases evidence
inconsistency and reflect conflict between Fourth Amendment and modern law
enforcement techniques and "modem realities" of "interactions between the po-
lice and the citizenry"); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
240 [Vol. 55: p. 235
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whether a seizure occurs, five cases have been particularly instructive:
Tery, Mendenhal4 Royer, Chesternut, and Hodari.36
A. Yielding to Law Enforcement Efficiency Concerns:
The Supreme Court's Definition of a Seizure
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Terry, precedent dic-
tated that, absent probable cause, individuals could not be seized without
violating the Fourth Amendment.3 7 Adherence to this standard proved
difficult for law enforcement officers who viewed suspicious activity but
lacked the requisite probable cause necessary to conduct further investiga-
tion.38 The Supreme Court recognized such law enforcement concerns in
Terry, and concluded that the interests of the public and law enforcement
required lowering the threshold for constitutional seizures.39 As a caveat,
HARv. L. REV. 820, 844 (1994) (noting "Fourth Amendment's general command of
'reasonableness' must be read in light of changing circumstances").
36. For a discussion of each of these cases on the issue of what constitutes a
seizure, see infra notes 37-80 and accompanying text.
37. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1968) (noting that Fourth Amendment
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and equating reason-
ableness-as interpreted in "traditional jurisprudence"-with guarantee of arrest
or seizure based on probable cause). Justice Warren described the argument
against adoption of the "stop and frisk" exception as based on the following
premise:
[T]he police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and
search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the
Fourth Amendment... . The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argu-
ment runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intru-
sion upon protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed
system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the
commands of the Constitution.
Id. at 11.
38. See id. at 10 (recognizing frequent argument that police officers are often
required to respond to "rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city
streets" necessitating "flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of
information they possess"). The Court articulated the government interest inher-
ent in the "stop and frisk" doctrine as the need for "effective crime prevention and
detection." Id. at 22. The Court further noted that "[i]t is this interest which un-
derlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Id.
39. See id. at 30 (concluding police can effectuate Terry stop where officer
reasonably believes, based upon identifiable facts, that criminal activity has been,
is, or will be occurring and that seizure is necessary to conduct further investiga-
tion and/or protect themselves and others). The Court articulated that the nature
of the arguments presented in the record and at oral argument centered on the
need of police officers to effectively conduct investigations versus Fourth Amend-
ment interests in protecting individuals from unreasonable search and seizure. See
id. at 9-10 (describing procedural posture of case). Here, the record indicated that
the police officer involved had witnessed the petitioner, along with another indi-
vidual, engaged in activity the officer believed to indicate that they were "casing" a
store. See id. at 5-6 (describing case facts). Specifically, the officer viewed the indi-
viduals look into the window of a store, walk a short distance, turn back, peer into
the window again, and return to talk to a third individual conferring with the two
2010] NOTE 241
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however, the Court articulated that such seizures-so-called "Terry
stops"-must be premised on reasonable, articulable facts and limited to
the time in which officers could confirm or dispel their suspicions."0 In all
other cases, evidence obtained during a seizure must be suppressed in ac-
cordance with the exclusionary rule to protect Fourth Amendment
rights.4 1 With this balance of individual rights and law enforcement con-
cerns established, the Court defined seizures as occurring "whenever a po-
lice officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away."42
The Supreme Court further developed its standard for determining
when a seizure occurs in Mendenhall and Royerby introducing the "reasona-
ble person" and "totality of the circumstances" analyses. 43 In Mendenhall,
Drug Enforcement Agency agents questioned and searched the defen-
dant, believing she fit the drug courier profile.44 In holding that the de-
fendant was not seized, a plurality of the Court concluded that a person is
seized "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not
free to leave." 45 The Court's inclusion of the "reasonable person" and
parties engaged in this behavior. See id. (same). Based on the officer's thirty years
of experience as a patrol officer, he believed that the three individuals were en-
gaged in suspicious behavior and further investigation was required. See id. at 22
(same). It was on this conclusion that the officer initiated a "stop and frisk" of the
three parties and recovered the weapon at issue. See id. at 6-7 (same).
40. See id. at 30 (concluding that "[w]here a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity is afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous," Terry stops can be constitutionally conducted).
41. See id. at 15 (stipulating that Court's holding does not render exclusionary
rule obsolete and noting that "courts still retain their traditional responsibility to
guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the
Constitution requires").
42. See id. at 16 (describing when seizure occurs under Terry standard).
43. For further discussion of the "reasonable person" and "totality of the cir-
cumstances" aspects of the Court's seizure standard, see infra notes 44-55 and ac-
companying text.
44. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 54748 (1980) (describing
case facts and defining drug courier profile as "an informally compiled abstract of
characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs"). The Court de-
tailed the respondent's characteristics as noted by the DEA agents:
In this case the agents thought it relevant that (1) the respondent was
arriving on a flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by the agents to be a
place of origin for much of the heroin brought to Detroit; (2) the respon-
dent was the last person to leave the plane, "appeared to be very ner-
vous," and "completely scanned the whole area where [the agents] were
standing"; (3) after leaving the plane the respondent proceeded past the
baggage area without claiming any luggage; and (4) the respondent
changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
Id. at 548 n.1.
45. See id. at 554-55 (plurality opinion) (explaining that Terry's "free to leave"
seizure standard now includes consideration of how reasonable person would view
situation based on totality of circumstances and noting, "[iun the absence of some
such evidence" such as display of weapon or physical touching, "otherwise inoffen-
242 [Vol. 55: p. 235
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"totality of the circumstances" analyses provided objective standards to be
applied to fact-specific scenarios. 4 6 In the defendant's case, the incident
occurred largely in public, no weapons were displayed, and the defendant
was "expressly told" that she was "free to decline to cooperate with their
inquiry."47 As a result, the Court held that a reasonable person would
have felt free to leave and therefore no seizure occurred.48
In contrast, in Royer, the Supreme Court reasoned that a seizure had
occurred because the defendant would not have felt free to leave based on
the totality of the circumstances where: he was confined in a small area,
confronted by officers who divulged the reason he was detained, and was
compelled to turn over possession of his driver's license, luggage, and
plane ticket.49 The Court cautioned, however, that the decision should
sive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of
law, amount to a seizure of that person"). In particular, the Court offered the
following examples of circumstances or elements that "might indicate a seizure,
even where the person did not attempt to leave": "the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of
the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Id. at 554 (citing Dun-
away v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16).
46. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of
Seizure: What Is a "Seizure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 619, 625-26 (1990) (indicating that Mendenhall provided Su-
preme Court with first opportunity since Terry to "attempt to formulate a test to
measure when a seizure short of a physical restraint occurs" and recognizing test
derived from this decision as "reasonable person standard").
47. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555-57 (plurality opinion) (applying "reasona-
ble person" and "totality of circumstances" test to facts of instant case to identify if
reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and concluding that facts did not
amount to seizure). Here, the alleged seizure consisted of two DEA agents identi-
fying themselves to the defendant, requesting her identification and plane ticket-
both of which were returned upon review of the items-and inquiring as to why
she was traveling under a different name, and subsequently asking whether she
would accompany them to the DEA office in the airport for further questions. See
id. at 548 (majority opinion) (describing facts of case). Once inside the DEA of-
fice, the agents requested to search her clothing, handbag, and person, but indi-
cated that she "had the right to decline the search if she desired." See id. (same).
The defendant consented to a search, which yielded two packages of cocaine that
the defendant later moved to suppress. See id. (same).
48. See id. at 555 (plurality opinion) (evaluating facts of case and concluding
reasonable person would feel free to leave based on totality of circumstances).
49. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983) (plurality opinion) (ap-
plying Mendenhall standard to facts of case). In this case, two law enforcement
officers confronted Royer because they believed that he fit the "drug courier pro-
file"-defined here as carrying luggage that appeared to be heavy, dressing casu-
ally, appearing pale and nervous, looking around at other people, and paying for
the plane ticket in cash, in addition to other factors. See id. at 493 (describing facts
of case). Upon the officers' request, Royer turned over his license and airline
ticket without verbally consenting. See id. at 494 (same). The officers identified a
discrepancy between Royer's name on his license and plane ticket, and when they
were unsatisfied with his explanation, they took Royer to a room away from the
terminal for further questioning. See id. (same). A plurality of the Court, in assess-
ing these facts in relation to the Terry and Mendenhall standards, expressed concern
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not be considered a litmus test for seizure "even in the discrete category of
airport encounters."5 0 Moreover, the Court reinforced that the seizure
standard dictates that courts conduct fact-specific analyses in each case
rather than assume any factor or combination thereof as dispositive. 5 1
Finally, in Chesternut, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment
to a flexible and totality of the circumstances standard. 52 The Court de-
clined to adopt a bright-line test to define what constitutes a seizure, rea-
about the nature of the questioning and the manner in which it took place, and
ultimately determined that based on these facts he had been seized. See id. at 496-
99 (applying Terry and Mendenhall standards to facts of Royer). Specifically, the
Court noted:
Royer had "found himself in a small enclosed area being confronted by
two police officers-a situation which presents an almost classic defini-
tion of imprisonment." The detectives' statement to Royer that he was
suspected of transporting narcotics also bolstered the finding that Royer
was "in custody" at the time the consent to search was given. In addition,
the detectives' possession of Royer's airline ticket and their retrieval and
possession of his luggage made it clear . . . that Royer was not free to
leave.
Id. at 495-96.
50. See id. at 506-07 (concluding that seizure occurred here but cautioning
that not all airport encounters between suspects and officers are seizures). In cau-
tioning against the decision being applied too broadly, the Court stated:
We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a
consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure
exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop. Even in the discrete category
of airport encounters, there will be endless variations in the facts and
circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the courts can
reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable
answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search
or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.; see also Stephen E. Henderson, "Move On" Orders as Fourth Amendment Seizures,2008 BYU L. REv. 1, 12 (2008) (noting similarity between Roer's refusal to gener-
ate bright-line seizure test with Terry's "refusal to cabin what can constitute a
'seizure' more precisely than a restraint upon liberty"). Henderson also reiterates
that the Royer decision "reflects a healthy realism regarding the fact-specific nature
of the 'feel free to leave' inquiry." Id.
51. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's rationale in framing a seizure
definition based on the "reasonable person" and "totality of the circumstances"
assessments, see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
52. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 (1988) (concluding
Court adopted "reasonable person" standard because its lack of precision and flex-
ibility in analyzing totality of circumstances factors ensured fact-specific inquiry).
In particular, Justice Blackmun articulated:
The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the
coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus
on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what consti-
tutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not
free to "leave" will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at
issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.
While the test is flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of
police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent
application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the par-
ticular individual's response to the actions of the police. The test's objec-
tive standard-looking to the reasonable man's interpretation of the
244
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soning that such approach would not properly balance the interests of
individual rights protection and law enforcement.5 3 Instead, the Court
reiterated its "clear direction" that in each case the seizure analysis is
based on "all of the circumstances surrounding the incident."5 4 Notably,
this approach stands in sharp contrast to the standard adopted three years
later in Hodari.5 5
B. "Breaking Away"from Precedent: The Supreme Court's Redefinition
of Seizure in Hodari
Hodari represented a significant departure from precedent by redefin-
ing the seizure analysis through a bright-line standard applicable in "show
of authority" and, arguably, "physical force" cases.5 6 In Hodari, the suspect
conduct in question-allows the police to determine in advance whether
the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Clancy, supra note 46, at 627-28 (describing
Justice Blackmun's effort in Chesternut to explain reasonable person standard).
53. See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572-73 (discussing arguments that seizure de-
fined by "a bright-line applicable to all investigatory pursuits, have failed to heed
this Court's clear direction that any assessment as to whether police conduct
amounts to a seizure .. . must take into account 'all of the circumstances surround-
ing the incident'" and rejecting Court's "traditional contextual approach"). In
particular, the Government forwarded the argument that an individual is not
seized until "actually apprehend[ed]" and the respondent alleged that all police
"chases" are seizures. See id. at 572 (describing facts and procedural posture of
case). In rejecting the Government's argument, the Court noted that such a rule
would in essence endorse a holding in which "lack of objective and particularized
suspicion would not poison police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the
police did not succeed in actually apprehending the individual." Id. The Court
also held that the defendant's bright-line standard for what constituted a seizure
was an inappropriate interpretation of precedent because it would dictate "that the
police may never pursue an individual absent a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting that he is engaged in criminal activity." Id.
54. See id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980)) (endorsing totality of circumstances standard in lieu of standard where
one factor is dispositive). For further discussion of the parameters of the Court's
totality of the circumstances standard, see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
55. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Hodari and an exami-
nation of the seizure standard it adopted, see infra notes 56-80 and accompanying
text.
56. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (holding seizure oc-
curs in show of authority cases only when suspect submits to such assertion and
noting that "[t]he word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands
or application of physical force to restrain movement"); see also Renee Paradis,
Carpe Demonstratores: Towards a Bright-Line Rule Governing Seizure in Excessive Force
Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 316, 331 (2003) (noting that
Hodari "drew a sharp line between seizure by show of authority and seizure by
physical force," resulting in new standard whereby Mendenhall analysis was "a neces-
sary, but not a sufficient" condition and submission to show of authority or applica-
tion of physical force became dispositive); Richard W. Zahn, California v. Hodari
D.: An Evolving Definition of Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV.
447, 469-70 (1992) (concluding that Hodari redefined seizure standard as "termi-
nation of movement" test in both show of authority and physical force cases).
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fled after seeing a police cruiser.5 7 Suspicious of the suspect's unpro-
voked flight, one officer exited the vehicle and pursued the suspect on
foot.5 8 The suspect was unaware he was being followed until he saw the
officer running toward him.5 9 At that moment, the suspect discarded
crack cocaine onto the ground and was subsequently tackled by the of-
ficer.6 0 At trial, the suspect moved to suppress the cocaine as illegally
seized evidence based on the theory that his seizure occurred when he saw
the officer running toward him.6 1 Specifically, the suspect argued that
because the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion until after he dis-
carded the cocaine, the evidence was obtained pursuant to an illegal
seizure and therefore subject to exclusionary rule protections. 6 2 Granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court defined the question as "whether, with re-
spect to a show of authority as with respect to application of physical force,
a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield."6 3 The Hodari
Court held that it does not.64
In arriving at this conclusion, Hodari diverged from precedent by em-
ploying common law arrest standards to assess when a seizure occurs.6 5
57. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 622-23 (describing facts of case). The record indi-
cated that the two officers involved in the case were patrolling in a high-crime area
of Oakland, California. See id. (same). The officers were driving in an unmarked
police car and dressed in plain clothes, but were wearing jackets with "Police" writ-
ten on the front and back. See id. (same). As the officers turned onto 63rd Ave-
nue, they witnessed Hodari standing with three or four other individuals around a
red parked car. See id. (same). As soon as the individuals saw the police car they
"panicked, and took flight." See id. (same).
58. See id. (describing encounter between police and defendant).
59. See id. (describing encounter between police and defendant). The officer
who pursued Hodari on foot ran north on 63rd and then west to cut off the sus-
pect's path as he ran south on 62nd Avenue. See id. (same). Hodari was looking
behind him as he ran and did not realize that he was being pursued until the
officer "was almost upon him." See id. (same).
60. See id. (describing police officer's capture of defendant). When Hodari
observed the officer, he tossed what appeared to be a small rock, and a moment
later the officer tackled him. See id. (same).
61. See id. at 623-24 (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
Hodari, a minor, moved to suppress the evidence against him in the juvenile pro-
ceeding. See id. at 623 (describing procedural posture of case). His motion rested
on the proposition that he was seized when he saw the officer running toward him
because a reasonable person in his position would not believe that they were free
to leave. See id. (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
62. See id. at 623-24 (explaining argument in support of motion to suppress).
The Court notes that the Government conceded that the officer did not have rea-
sonable suspicion until Hodari discarded the cocaine. See id. at 624 n.1 (describ-
ing procedural posture of case). Therefore, if the Court determined that Hodari
was seized at that moment, the evidence would be inadmissible. See id. at 624(describing nature of seizure standard and implications if Hodari was seized with-
out reasonable suspicion).
63. Id. at 626 (stating question on review and including assessment of seizure
by physical force standard despite considering show of authority factual scenario).
64. See id. (providing central holding of case).
65. See id. at 624-28 (examining common law arrest standards in response to
respondent's motion to suppress rather than employing Fourth Amendment pre-
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Specifically, the Court endorsed common law arrest as the "quintessential
'seizure of the person'" and noted that arrest requires either physical
touching or submission to show of authority.66 In view of this standard,
the Court concluded that while the Mendenhall assessment identified
whether a show of authority occurred, it represented a "necessary" but
"insufficient" condition of seizure.6 7
As a "show of authority" case, Hodari was clear in its articulation of the
seizure standard in this context.68 Specifically, if a court determines that
an officer made a show of authority based on Mendenhall, a seizure occurs
when the individual submits to the assertion.69 Thus, the Court in Hodari
cedent from Terry, Mendenhall, Royer, and Chesternut, and holding "[w]e do not
think it desirable, even as a matter of policy, to stretch the Fourth Amendment
beyond its words and beyond the meaning of arrest, as respondent urges"); see also
Paradis, supra note 56, at 332 (explaining that Hodari was based not on recent
precedent but on "nineteenth-century treatises and cases discussing the common
law of arrest"); Urbonya, supra note 12, at 1406 (noting thatJustice Scalia, writing
for the majority in Hodari, "used his view of the common law to reconsider the
stop-and-frisk doctrine" of Teny and redefined seizure by common law standards).
For further discussion of Fourth Amendment seizure precedent prior to Hodari,
see supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
66. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624-27 (holding common law arrest standards are
appropriate in assessing Fourth Amendment seizure). In particular, after estab-
lishing arrest as the "quintessential 'seizure of the person,'" Justice Scalia contin-
ued that "under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . . the mere grasping or
application of physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in
subduing the arrestee, was sufficient" and, with respect to show of authority:
Mere words will not constitute an arrest, while, on the other hand, no
actual, physical touching is essential. The apparent inconsistency in the
two parts of this statement is explained by the fact that an assertion of
authority and purpose to arrest followed by submission of the arrestee
constitutes an arrest. There can be no arrest without either touching or
submission.
Id. at 626-27 (quoting Rollin M. Perkins, The Law ofArrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 206
(1940)).
67. See id. at 628 (rejecting Mendenhall standard as appropriate test for seizure
and concluding that Mendenhall Court intended to create "a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition for seizure" based on decision's stipulation "that a person has
been seized 'only if,' not that he has been seized 'whenever'" a reasonable person
"would have believed he was not free to leave"). Specifically, the Court clarified
that as a "necessary," but not a "sufficient" condition, "Mendenhall establishes that the
test of existence of a 'show of authority' is an objective one: not whether the citizen
perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the
officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person." Id.
68. See id. at 625-27 (concluding show of authority seizure does not occur
when suspect does not yield and applying this standard to determine that Hodari
was not seized until tackled).
69. See id. at 626 (referencing common law arrest principles in defining show
of authority seizure standard). In arriving at its conclusion that an individual must
submit to a show of authority for a seizure to occur, the Court explained:
[Seizure] .. . does not remotely apply .. . to the prospect of a policeman
yelling "Stop, in the name of the law!" at a fleeing form that continues to
flee. That is no seizure. Nor can the result respondent wishes to achieve
be produced-indirectly, as it were-by suggesting that [the officer's] un-
complied-with show of authority was a common law arrest ... [a]n arrest
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concluded that because the suspect did not initially submit, he was not
seized until he was tackled, and therefore the cocaine was admissible evi-
dence because reasonable suspicion was present at the time of the
seizure. 70
Despite Hodari's clarity with respect to seizures in the show of author-
ity context, ambiguity surrounds Hodari's physical force seizure standard.7 1
The Court in Hodari addressed the question of whether an individual is
seized upon "application of physical force, if he does not yield" and re-
sponded that in this scenario there is no seizure-but the facts of the case
only related to show of authority.72 Therefore, the Court's discussion of
what constitutes a seizure in the context of physical force is, arguably, only
dicta.7 3
In addition, Hodari's guidance with respect to the concept of continu-
ing seizure remains unclear because the opinion equated seizure with
common law arrest-noting that arrest occurs by "the mere grasping or
application of physical force . . . whether or not it succeeded in subduing
the arrestee" 7 4-yet later hypothesized that had the suspect been touched
requires either physical force or, where that is absent, submission to the as-
sertion of authority.
Id.
70. See id. at 629 (holding that if officer made show of authority and Hodari
did not yield to it, then Hodari was not seized until later tackled, thereby render-
ing evidence admissible because officers possessed reasonable suspicion after co-
caine was discarded).
71. For a discussion of Hodari's inconsistent commentary on the definition of
seizure by physical force, see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
72. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626 (stating that "[t]he narrow question before us
is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of
physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield" despite
fact-set involving only show of authority scenario).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Dupree, Crim. No. 08-280, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68127, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009) (recognizing that "the putative seizure in
Hodari involved a show of police authority" and agreeing with Government's argu-
ment that physical force seizure definition is dicta); Paradis, supra note 56, at 332
(noting that "technically" Hodari Court discussed definition of physical force
seizure in dicta because facts of case involved show of authority scenario).
74. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624 (citing Whithead v. Keyes, 85 Mass. (1 Allen) 495,501 (1862)). The Court examined common law arrest standards and concluded
that arrest was affected even through unsuccessful applications of physical force
that fail to stop a suspect. See id. (connecting common law arrest standard with
seizure definition by stating "[t]he word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a
laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even
when it is ultimately unsuccessful"). In defining the common law arrest standards
as applicable, the Court reinforced its conclusion by noting:
There can be constructive detention, which will constitute an arrest, al-
though the party is never actually brought within the physical control of
the party making an arrest. This is accomplished by merely touching,
however slightly, the body of the accused, by the party making the arrest
and for that purpose, although he does not succeed in stopping or hold-
ing him even for an instant; as where the bailiff had tried to arrest one
who fought him off by a fork, the court said, "If the bailiff touched him
that had been an arrest."
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by police and broken away before discarding the cocaine, there would not
have been a "continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity."7 5 Although
this hypothetical supported the Court's ultimate conclusion that seizure
does not occur unless the suspect actually yields to force, the hypothetical
conflicts with the Court's definitions of seizure derived from common law
arrest, which provide that seizure occurs with the slightest application of
physical force.7 6
As a result of such inherent inconsistencies, the Hodai decision has
generated confusion as to whether the application of physical force alone
constitutes a seizure, or whether submission is required.7 7 Regardless of
which definition the Court supported, both embody a significant depar-
ture from Fourth Amendment precedent in which physical force once
constituted one of several factors comprising the totality of the circum-
stances analysis.78 Likewise, the show of authority seizure definition con-
tradicts prior standards by making submission dispositive.79 Combined,
Hodari's internal inconsistency and break from precedent has led federal
Id. at 625 (quoting A. CORNELIUs, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930)).
75. See id. (providing hypothetical based on current facts to articulate that
"[a] seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact" and rejecting notion of
continuing arrest during "period of fugitivity" even if arrestee is touched (quoting
in part Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 471 (1874))).
76. For a discussion of Hodari's analogy of common law arrest standards with
the definition of physical force seizure, as well as its emphasis on the fact that an
arrest can be affected by even unsuccessful application of physical force, see supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting
seizure occurs even if application of physical force is unsuccessful and concluding
that momentary compliance with show of authority constitutes arrest despite subse-
quent resistance or struggle); United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir.
1999) (defining seizure as sum of two parts: (1) "the arresting officer must apply
physical force or display a show of authority"; and (2) "the physical force or show
of authority must cause the fleeing subject to stop"); United States v. Hernandez,
27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to adopt rule that suspect was seized
when he paused momentarily on show of authority and was touched by police
officer but subsequently fled); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that even though police applied physical force by shooting defendant's
vehicle, defendant was not seized "because they failed to produce a stop").
78. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (plurality opinion)
(explaining that standard for determining what counts as seizure in Terry included
consideration of how reasonable person would view situation based on totality of
circumstances); see also Paradis, supra note 56, at 331 (explaining that before
Hodari separated seizure standard into discrete physical force and show of author-
ity categories, "physical force was considered one factor of many to be weighed in
the all-encompassing 'free to leave' test").
79. See Paradis, supra note 56, at 331-32 (noting that Hodai "drastically limited
seizure by show of authority" by concluding that submission is dispositive in assess-
ing seizure). For a discussion of the prior standards, particularly the factors em-
phasized in Mendenhall, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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courts to struggle in interpreting the decision-particularly in the realm
of continuing seizure.8 0
III. THE CONTINUING SEIZURE CONCEPT AFTER HODARI: CONTINUALLY
SEIZED BY CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS
Though a number of federal and state courts have expressed concern
that Hodari is inconsistent with precedent and detrimental to individual
rights, its definition of seizure as applied to its narrow facts is clear: in
show of authority cases, seizure occurs on submission.8 1 Hodari is less
clear, however, about how to assess when a seizure occurs if a suspect mo-
mentarily yields to a show of authority or is physically touched before
breaking away.8 2 Although Hodari did not directly address these scenarios,
its definition of seizure and the factually similar hypothetical contained in
the opinion have led federal courts to employ the decision in assessing
continuing seizure cases.83 In this context, the circuit courts diverge as to
whether Hodari endorsed or rejected the concept of continuing seizure.84
The Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits conclude that the
concept of continuing seizure is inconsistent with Hodari.8 5 Conversely,
the Third and Tenth Circuits recognize the concept of continuing
seizure.86
80. For a discussion of how federal courts diverge in interpreting the concept
of continuing seizure in view of Hodari, see infra notes 81-116 and accompanying
text.
81. For a discussion of the show of authority seizure standard articulated in
Hodari and its application to the facts of that case, see supra notes 68-70 and accom-
panying text.
82. For a discussion of Hodari's definition of seizure by application of physical
force, and an examination of its conflicting discussion of that standard, see supra
notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Goines, 604 F. Supp. 2d 533, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that even if initial seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion,
court must consider whether there was sufficient reasonable suspicion at time of
subsequent seizure); United States v. Williams, 608 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (concluding that where officer grabbed suspect's arm and suspect broke
away and fled, legality of officer's first seizure was irrelevant). For a discussion of
the manner in which federal appellate courts have applied Hodai in assessing con-
tinuing seizure scenarios, see infra notes 85-116 and accompanying text.
84. For a discussion of conflicting circuit court interpretations of Hodari spe-
cifically with respect to whether the concept of continuing seizure is constitutional,
see infra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of case law from the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits rejecting the concept of continuing seizure, see infra notes 87-103
and accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of case law from the Third and Tenth Circuits endorsing
the concept of continuing seizure, see infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
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A. The Majority View: Resisting "Submission" to the
Continuing Seizure Doctrine
Since 1991, a majority of federal courts have rejected the concept of
continuing seizure on grounds that it is inconsistent with the holding and
policy concerns articulated by the Supreme Court in Hodari.8 7 In United
States v. Hernandez,8 8 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of continuing
seizure in response to a defendant's motion to suppress evidence he dis-
carded while fleeing, but before being apprehended by police.8 9 Prior to
taking flight, the defendant stopped momentarily when the officer asked
to speak with him, was grabbed by the officer while attempting to run, but
broke away before ultimately being apprehended by police.9 0 The defen-
dant based his suppression motion on the theory that he submitted to the
officer's show of authority, and therefore was seized when he initially
stopped-albeit momentarily.9 1
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, and held that
although the defendant had paused and the officer applied physical force,
the defendant was not seized until ultimately apprehended.9 2 In arriving
at this conclusion, the court determined that Hodari did not endorse the
87. See, e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing suspect not seized when he "halt[s] temporarily" in response to show of au-
thority through order to stop, but then flees); United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d
762, 768 (7th Cir. 1999) (defining seizure as sum of two parts: (1) "the arresting
officer must apply physical force or display a show of authority"; and (2) "the physi-
cal force or show of authority must cause the fleeing subject to stop"); United
States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to adopt rule
that suspect was seized when he paused momentarily on show of authority and was
touched by police officer but subsequently fled); United States v. Washington, 12
F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding defendant was not seized when he
momentarily complied with order to pull car over to side of road but then sped
away before officers approached, despite defendant's momentary submission to
authority).
88. 27 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir. 1994).
89. See id. at 1406 (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
90. See id. at 1405 (describing facts of case). The record indicated that police
officers saw the defendant jump over a fence in dark clothing and run to an apart-
ment building gate. See id. (same). Concerned that the defendant was engaged in
illegal activity, one of the officers approached him, identified himself as a police
officer, and stated that he needed to talk to him. See id. (same). As the officer
approached the defendant, however, he saw the defendant reach into his waist
band "in a drawing motion." See id. (same). The defendant paused when he saw
the officer, then turned and attempted to climb over a gate. See id. (same). The
officer then grabbed the defendant while he attempted to climb the gate and, as
the two struggled, the gate "burst open," causing the officer to fall. See id. (same).
As the defendant fled, he discarded the handgun at issue before eventually being
tackled and apprehended by the officer. See id. (same).
91. See id. at 1406 (describing facts and procedural posture of case as well as
defendant's contention that evidence should be inadmissible because police
lacked reasonable suspicion when police initially attempted to detain defendant
for questioning).
92. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's rationale in arriving at its holding
in Hernandez, see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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concept of continuing seizure.9 3 The court derived this interpretation
from Hodari's emphasis on submission and concluded that momentary
compliance or the ineffective application of physical force cannot, without
more, constitute seizure. 9 4 Rather, the Ninth Circuit viewed Hodari as re-
quiring actual submission absent a subsequent attempt to resist.9 5 Conse-
quently, the court reasoned that the defendant's argument was
incongruous with Hodari and, if adopted, would encourage flight "after
the slightest contact with an officer in order to discard evidence."9 6
Similarly, in United States v. Baldwin,9 7 the Second Circuit held that
Hodari does not support the continuing seizure concept.9 8 In Baldwin, the
court considered whether an individual is seized if they pause-and there-
fore momentarily submit-prior to breaking away.99 Rejecting this argu-
ment, the court reasoned that, although Hodari provided that an
93. See Hernandez, 27 F.3d at 1406 (interpreting Supreme Court's Hodari hold-
ing as rejecting continuing seizure).
94. See id. (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 621, 626 (1991)) (assess-
ing Hodad's seizure standard language as well as Ninth Circuit case law and con-
cluding that actual submission is required in show of authority and physical force
seizure cases). Specifically, the court noted that Hodari precedent prescribed for
lower courts that "[a] seizure occurs either when a suspect is physically forced to
stop or when the suspect submits to the officer's show of authority." Id.
95. See id. (concluding Hodari supports Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "[a]
seizure does not occur if, in response to a show of authority, the subject does not
yield; in that event, the seizure occurs only when the police physically subdue the
subject").
96. See id. at 1407 (reviewing facts of case in view of Hodari to determine that
Hernandez was not seized until tackled, and supporting this conclusion with
Hodad's policy argument of encouraging cooperation with police). In particular,
the Ninth Circuit clarified the rationale of its holding, stating:
We decline to adopt a rule whereby momentary hesitation and direct eye
contact prior to flight constitute submission to a show of authority. Such
a rule would encourage suspects to flee after the slightest contact with an
officer in order to discard evidence, and yet still maintain Fourth Amend-
ment protections. A seizure does not occur if an officer applies physical
force in an attempt to detain a suspect but such force is ineffective.
Id. (citing Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625).
97. 496 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2007).
98. For further discussion of the Second Circuit's holding in Baldwin, as well
as its interpretation of Hodari as rejecting the concept of continuing seizure, see
infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
99. See Baldwin, 496 F.3d at 216 (describing facts of case). In Baldwin, police
officers, acting on an anonymous tip, pulled over the defendant's car because it
matched the description of a recent police report. See id. at 216-17 (same). When
the police car activated its patrol lights, the defendant pulled over on the side of
the road and the police vehicle pulled in behind him. See id. at 217 (same). As the
officers approached the defendant's vehicle, the defendant "simply stared back" at
the officers and refused to comply with their demand that he show his hands. See
id. (same). The officers then drew their guns, but before they were able to ap-
proach the vehicle, the defendant sped away, only later to be apprehended. See id.
(same). At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the evidence obtained during
his seizure, including weapons, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. See id. (describing
facts and procedural posture of case).
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individual is seized upon submission to a show of authority, mere momen-
tary compliance followed by resistance proves insufficient.100 Relying on
similar holdings of the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that "the import of Hodari . . . [is] that 'an order to stop
must be obeyed or enforced physically to constitute a seizure."' 10 1 There-
fore, because the defendant's actions reflected "evasion" rather than sub-
mission, his momentary compliance did not render him seized. 10 2
Importantly, although the Second Circuit had earlier questioned whether
Hodari provides adequate individual rights protections, in Baldwin the
court echoed Hodaz's argument that the submission requirement discour-
ages flight from law enforcement. 0 3
100. See id. at 218 (interpreting Hodai as requiring actual submission rather
than momentary hesitation not indicative of compliance). Specifically, the Second
Circuit noted that "[w]e have understood the import of Hodari to be that 'an order
to stop must be obeyed or enforced physically to constitute a seizure.'" Id. (quot-
ing United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 572 (2d Cir. 1996)).
101. Id. at 218 (quoting Swindle, 407 F.3d at 572); see also United States v.
Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding no continuing seizure takes
place when initial show of authority did not cause defendant to stop, and that
individual is not seized until physical force is applied); United States v. Hernandez,
27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding no continuing seizure occurs when
suspect momentarily complies with show of authority even if physically touched
before breaking away); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1130 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (holding that because defendant did not submit to officer's order, he was
not seized).
102. See Baldwin, 496 F.3d at 219 (applying Hodari standard to facts of case
and holding defendant was not seized when he initially pulled over because "[his]
conduct, all circumstances considered, amounted to evasion of police authority,
not submission" as required in seizure cases). In addition, the court rejected the
defendant's second argument that he was seized according to Mendenhall by reiter-
ating Hodari's conclusion that the Mendenhall standard does not define seizure. See
id. (discussing defendant's argument that he was seized because reasonable person
in his situation would not have felt free to leave, but concluding that argument
fails because Hodari distinguished Mendenhall as "necessary, but not sufficient" con-
dition for seizure).
103. See id. (indicating that Hodari's seizure standard appropriately "appl[ies]
the deterrent to [police officers'] genuine, successful seizures" rather than encour-
aging suspects to not comply with officers' requests to stop). Despite quoting the
Hodari language here, the Second Circuit has in the past expressed concern with
the policy implications of the court's seizure definition. See Swindle, 407 F.3d at
573 (expressing policy concerns with Hodai standard). In particular, the Second
Circuit noted in Swindle
A substantial argument could be made that a broader definition of
"seizure"-or some other remedy-is required to adequately protect
Fourth Amendment values from the harms flowing from police initiation
of Terry stops without reasonable suspicion. Although the Hodari Court
stated that "only a few of those orders [to stop], we must presume, will be
without adequate basis," the possibility that unreasonable orders are in-
frequent does not necessarily make them acceptable. Even if the kind of
order given in Swindle's case is rare-and we do not suggest that it is-we
see no persuasive reason for the law to tolerate it. In view of what we
believe to be the controlling case, however, we must affirm a conviction
that was achieved with evidence obtained by an abuse of police power. A
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B. The Minority View: Exhibiting "Compliance" with the
Continuing Seizure Concept
Since 1991, two circuit courts have diverged from the majority inter-
pretation of Hodari to find that the decision supports the continuing
seizure concept. 10 4 In United States v. Morgan, 0 5 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the question where the defendant momentarily yielded and re-
sponded "[w]hat do you want" to an officer's request for him to "hold
up." 0 6 Despite his subsequent flight, the Tenth Circuit held that the de-
fendant was seized during this initial encounter.10 7 Specifically, the court
relied on language from Hodari indicating that an individual is seized
upon submission to a show of authority. 08 According to its strict interpre-
tation of this language, the court found that because the defendant com-
plied with the officer's initial request, such yielding-albeit temporary-
constituted submission, and thus rendered the defendant seized as of that
moment.10 9
Likewise, the Third Circuit held in United States v. Coggins'1 o that
Hodari supports the continuing seizure concept.'II In Coggins, the defen-
remedy for Swindle's Fourth Amendment complaint can come only from
a higher authority.
Id. (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627 (1991)). Nonetheless, the
Second Circuit ultimately concluded in Swindle that Hodari "compelled" a rejec-
tion of the concept of continuing seizure. See id. (rejecting continuing seizure
and, accordingly, ruling evidence obtained to be admissible).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2006) (en-
dorsing continuing seizure doctrine for application in show of authority and physi-
cal force cases); United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 653-54 (3d Cir. 1993)
(adopting continuing seizure doctrine in show of authority cases); United States v.
Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991) (endorsing continuing seizure as
concept allowed by Hodari).
105. 936 F.2d 1561 (10th Cir. 1991).
106. See id. at 1565 (describing facts of case). Here, the defendant argued
that he momentarily yielded to police show of authority because he stopped his
vehicle after being followed by a police car with its lights activated for several
blocks. See id. (same).
107. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Morgan and an analysis
of its rationale, see infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
108. See Morgan, 936 F.2d at 1567 (citing language from Hodari indicating that
show of authority seizures occur when law enforcement officers assert legitimate
authority and suspect submits).
109. See id. (applying show of authority seizure definition from Hodari to facts
of case and concluding that defendant was seized based on defendant's temporary
submission).
110. 986 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1993).
111. See id. at 651 (adopting continuing seizure doctrine in show of authority
cases based on Hodar); see also United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 313-16 (3d Cir.
2009) (affirming that seizure can occur solely through application of physical force
and relying on Brown to establish that individual who submits to show of authority
by "more than 'momentary compliance'" is seized despite subsequent flight);
United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2006) (endorsing continuing
seizure doctrine for show of authority and physical force cases).
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dant asked to use the restroom while he was detained for questioning.' 1 2
When officers denied his request, he sat back down only to later flee and
discard evidence before the police tackled him.113 In his motion to sup-
press, the defendant argued that he was seized when he initially complied
with the officers' request to remain for questioning.114 The Third Circuit
agreed, and in so doing, rejected the Government's contention that com-
pliance followed by resistance does not reflect actual submission."i 5
Rather, the court held that the defendant's initial compliance satisfied
Hodari's submission requirement, and thus the court concluded that ab-
sent reasonable suspicion at the time of initial submission, any evidence
subsequently discarded or discovered is inadmissible as fruit of the poison-
ous tree."i6
IV. DUPREE: EMBRACING CONTINUING SEIZURE AND
CEMENTING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The issue of continuing seizure recently re-emerged in United States v.
Dupree." 7 In Dupree, the defendant was charged with possession of a fire-
112. See Coggins, 986 F.2d at 652 (describing facts of case). The record indi-
cated that the suspect defendant was traveling with three other individuals, one of
whom was a known drug dealer. See id. (same). The group of men, including the
suspect defendant, traveled together by plane and rented a car once they arrived
in St. Croix. See id. (same). The DEA agents watching these individuals learned
from the rental car agency that they were due to return the vehicle in less than two
and a half hours. See id. (same). After confronting the men and asking them for
their identification and plane tickets, the agents learned that all of the tickets were
listed under the same name and paid for in cash. See id. (same). These facts com-
bined to alert the agents that the suspect may be involved in criminal activity. See
id. (providing details which led agents to conclude suspect defendant was poten-
tially involved in drug trafficking).
113. See id. at 652-53 (describing facts of case). According to the record, the
defendant asked to leave to go to the bathroom a second time after the DEA agent
denied his first request. See id. at 653 (same). The agent again indicated that the
defendant should remain until the completion of the questioning. See id. (same).
The defendant sat back down, then abruptly "walked off," broke into a run, and
during his flight pulled several small bags of cocaine out of his pockets and threw
them into the bushes outside the terminal. See id. (same).
114. See id. (describing procedural posture and legal arguments in case).
115. See id. at 653-54 (noting Government's argument that case is analogous
to Hodari because defendant did not actually submit, but concluding defendant
did in fact yield and therefore satisfied Hodari's submission requirement). The
district court here had interpreted Hodari as requiring that the individual actually
submit to police show of authority or application of physical force and, conse-
quently, held that the defendant was neither seized nor arrested. See id. at 654
(describing procedural posture of case). On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected
this finding. See id. (describing procedural posture of case).
116. See id. at 655 (holding that officers possessed reasonable suspicion when
defendant stopped, but recognizing that absent reasonable suspicion defendant's
motion would be granted).
117. See United States v. Dupree, Crim. No. 08-280-1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45296 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2009) (discussing issue of continuing seizure). For fur-
ther discussion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
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arm by a convicted felon.11 8 Dupree was stopped by two officers who re-
ceived a radio report that a shooting had occurred at Tenth and Oxford
Streets in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.' 1 9 The radio report indicated that
the suspect-who was a five foot, eight inch tall African American male
wearing blue jeans and a black hooded sweatshirt-had fled east on
Oxford. 120
While patrolling in the vicinity, the officers noticed Dupree, who was
riding a bicycle on Marshall Street and wearing clothing similar to the
reported suspect.1 2 1 After stopping their car, one officer exited the vehi-
cle and approached Dupree, who was still on his bicycle.122 The officer,
without first speaking to Dupree, "grabbed Dupree with both hands, one
holding [his] right elbow, the other gripping [his] right upper arm," and
then asked Dupree if he could speak with him "for a minute."' 2 3 The
officer held Dupree for approximately two seconds before Dupree twisted
out of the officer's grip, jumped off of the bicycle, slid it into the officer's
legs, and fled. 124 The officers chased Dupree for several minutes and wit-
nessed him discard a gun before they tackled and ultimately arrested
him.12 5
A. Dupree's Two-Second Seizure: The District Court Endorses the
Concept of Continuing Seizure
Dupree filed a motion to suppress the firearm, arguing that he was
seized without reasonable suspicion when the officer initially grabbed
him.12 6 The Government did not challenge the lack of reasonable suspi-
sylvania's examination of continuing seizure and its application of the concept to
the facts of Dupree, see infra notes 126-49 and accompanying text.
118. See United States v. Dupree, Crim. No. 08-280, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68127, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009) (describing facts and procedural posture of
case).
119. See id. at *2 (describing facts of case).
120. See id. (describing facts of case). The record indicated that no additional
information was provided with respect to the suspect's appearance or method of
travel. See id. at *2-3 (same).
121. See id. at *34 (describing facts of case). According to the record, Officer
Mabry-the officer who grabbed Dupree during the initial encounter at issue in
the case-noticed Dupree on Marshall Street, north of Oxford where the alleged
shooting occurred. See id. (same). Mabry's partner, Officer Shippen, had also no-
ticed Dupree but "had not pa[id] attention" to him because the flash report did
not indicate that the suspect had fled on a bicycle. See id. at *4 (same). The of-
ficers decided to pursue Dupree in their vehicle when Mabry informed Shippen
that he had identified an individual matching the description of the suspect. See
id. (same).
122. See id. (describing police encounter with Dupree).
123. See id. at *4-5 (describing police officer's show of authority).
124. See id. at *5 (describing two-second seizure).
125. See id. at *6 (describing police pursuit and ultimate capture of Dupree).
126. See id. (describing facts and procedural posture of case). Specifically,
Dupree argued that he was seized when the officer involved grabbed his arm,
rather than when he was tackled after he fled and had discarded the handgun at
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cion, but argued instead that Dupree was not seized for evidentiary pur-
poses until he was tackled.12 7 According to the Government, because the
officers possessed reasonable suspicion at the time they tackled Dupree
based on his flight and discarding of evidence, the weapon must be admit-
ted as abandoned. 128
Upon reviewing the motion, the Government's response, and con-
ducting an evidentiary hearing and oral argument, the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Dupree's suppression mo-
tion.'2 9 The Government filed a motion for reconsideration, contending
that the court manifested a "clear error of law" when it endorsed the con-
cept of continuing seizure.1 30 To this end, the Government cited holdings
of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, as well as those of numerous district
courts, supporting an interpretation of Hodai wherein momentary submis-
sion or the unsuccessful application of physical force does not constitute a
issue. See id. at *4-5 (describing facts of case). Dupree submitted a motion to sup-
press this evidence based on the contention that the police "had no proper justifi-
cation" for stopping him when he was initially grabbed by the officer. See id. at *6
(describing facts and procedural posture of case).
127. See id. at *5-6 (noting Government did not dispute that reasonable suspi-
cion was not present at outset).
128. See id. at *8 (stipulating that Government argued that Dupree was seized
only once he ultimately "came under the officers' control" and therefore weapon
was not illegally seized).
129. See id. (adopting Third Circuit's definition of physical force seizure ar-
ticulated in Brown and concluding definition should be applied to facts of current
case to adjudicate motion). In arriving at this conclusion, the district court relied
on the Third Circuit's opinion in Brown, which held that a seizure occurs when
"there is a 'laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain move-
ment, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006)) (describing district court's initial deci-
sion to grant motion to suppress). The district court also noted that in addition to
the definition quoted here, the Third Circuit further articulated in Brown that,
"[p]ut another way, when a seizure is effected by even the 'slightest application of
physical force,' it is immaterial whether the suspect yields to that force." Id. (quot-
ing Brown, 448 F.3d at 245) (referencing language from Brown defining physical
force seizure and recognizing that Brown definition quoted directly from Hodari).
According to this language, which the Third Circuit had in turn quoted from
Hodari, the court determined that Dupree was seized when the officer grabbed
him, despite his subsequent flight. See id. (applying Brown physical force seizure
definition to facts of case and concluding that because Brown indicated that seizure
occurs even with unsuccessful applications of physical force, Dupree was seized
when initially grabbed). Therefore, the court held that, because the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion at that time, the handgun was rendered inadmissible
as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. See id. at *10-13 (conducting assessment of
whether officers possessed reasonable suspicion, despite Government's concession,
and concluding reasonable suspicion was lacking).
130. See id. at *1-2 (describing procedural posture of case and noting premise
of Government's motion). For a discussion of the Government's rationale in con-
cluding that the district court manifested a "clear error of law" in its May 27, 2009
order, see infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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final seizure.13 In addition, the Government asserted that the court's in-
terpretation of Hodari resulted from a selective quoting of the decision
that failed to encapsulate both the legal holding and policy concerns ar-
ticulated by the Court.132
Despite these arguments, the district court affirmed its earlier holding
requiring suppression, and further held that the Third Circuit's definition
of physical force seizure in United States v. Brown,133 though arguably dicta,
established that Dupree was seized at the outset and thus continually
seized throughout the encounter. 134 In view of the prevailing circuit
court interpretation of Hodari since 1991, however, and based on the fact
that the Third Circuit has addressed continuing seizure in the context of
physical force only in dicta, the Government is currently appealing the
district court's decision to the Third Circuit.135
131. See Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *7-8 (discussing Govern-
ment's analogies to cases from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits); see also Motion for
Reconsideration of Gov't at 13-16, United States v. Dupree, Crim. No. 08-280, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009) (citing federal circuit court hold-
ings supportive of Government's position and including examination of federal
district court and state cases rejecting continuing seizure doctrine).
132. See Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *6-7 (recognizing Govern-
ment's position that language in Brown related to physical force seizure is dicta and
unrepresentative of Hodari holding); see also Motion for Reconsideration of Gov't,
supra note 131, at 9-12 (arguing that Brown selectively quoted Hodari and failed in
considering full meaning of Hodari outside the context of two cited quotes, as well
as quoting Hodari's policy argument as support for rejection of continuing seizure
position). In particular, the Government quoted the following passage from
Hodari in which the Supreme Court articulated its underlying policy rationale:
We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter, to stretch the Fourth
Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of arrest, as re-
spondent urges. Street pursuits always place the public at some risk, and
compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encouraged.
Only a few of those orders, we must presume, will be without adequate
basis, and since the addressee has no ready means of identifying the defi-
cient ones it almost invariably is the responsible course to comply. Un-
lawful orders will not be deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the
exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed. Since policemen do
not command "Stop!" expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping to
be outrun, it fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine, success-
ful seizures.
Motion for Reconsideration of Gov't, supra note 131, at 12 (quoting California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 621, 627 (1991)).
133. 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006).
134. For a discussion of the court's determination to employ the Third Cir-
cuit's physical force seizure definition and apply it to the instant case, see supra
note 136-43 and accompanying text.
135. See Interview with Robert Zauzmer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attor-
ney's Office for the E. Dist. of Pa. (Sept. 8, 2009) (discussing Government's appeal
of Dupree).
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B. Adoption by Submission: The Dupree Court Applies the Third Circuit's
Concept of Continuing Seizure
In reaffirming its earlier order requiring suppression of the seized
evidence, the district court employed the Third Circuit's definition of
seizure in Brown, which provides that in application of physical force cases,
a seizure occurs with the "slightest application" of force, irrespective of
whether such force ultimately restrains the suspect.1 3 6 Although the dis-
trict court acknowledged that the quoted language in Brown is considered
dicta because that case involved only a show of authority scenario, it never-
theless noted that the Third Circuit "expressly interpreted and relied" on
Hodari in developing its definitions of seizure.13 7 Specifically, the Third
Circuit determined that the defendant in Brown was seized when he sub-
mitted to a show of authority by "staying put" and complying with the of-
ficer's request to turn and place his hands on the patrol car, despite his
later attempt to resist.1 38 In so doing, the court concluded that Hodari
provides for continuing seizure if a seizure can be found during the first
encounter. 3 9
136. See Brown, 448 F.3d at 245 (citing Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626). For further
discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Brown, see infra notes 137-39 and ac-
companying text.
137. See Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *7-8 (recognizing that physi-
cal force seizure definition stated in Brown served as dicta because Brown is show of
authority case, but noting that Brown's definition directly quotes sections of
Hodari). In addition, the district court concluded that Brown developed standards
for physical force and show of authority seizure cases that are "operative" and
should be applied. See id. at *9 (discussing holding of Brown and assessing applica-
bility of physical force seizure definition to current case). To the parties' disagree-
ment as to the applicability and precedential value of Brown, the court stated,
"[s]uffice it to say that the cases marshaled by the parties on the issue evince less
that the earlier-noted language from Brown was errant dictum by the Third Circuit,
and more that discord exists in the federal courts over this significant issue of
Fourth Amendment law." Id.
138. See Brown, 448 F.3d at 243-44, 246 (holding that based on Hodari and
Fourth Amendment precedent, where suspect placed his hands on police car-or
made attempt to do so but did not touch the car-in response to officer's request
to frisk him and had engaged in polite dialogue with officers prior to this request,
suspect submitted to officer's show of authority and was seized, despite attempting
to escape).
139. See id. at 245-46 (concluding that suspect in Brown was seized despite
subsequent attempt to flee because he had "demonstrated more than momentary
compliance with the arresting officers demands," thereby effecting initial seizure
and rendering it valid irrespective of later attempted break from submission). The
Third Circuit in Brown then continued its discussion of show of authority seizure
and distinguished the current case and Coggins from Valentine in which it found
that a seizure did not occur. See id. at 246 (assessing Brown suspect's actions as
compared to suspect actions in other Third Circuit cases). In particular, the court
stipulated that for an individual to be seized in a show of authority case they must
exhibit "more than 'momentary' compliance" with the officer's assertion of au-
thority. See id. (quoting United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir.
2000)) (articulating show of authority seizure standard). According to this stan-
dard, the court determined that the suspect in Valentine was not seized because he
merely took two steps toward the officers which did not signify this level of compli-
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The Dupree court concluded that, in Brown, the Third Circuit offered
a clear definition of physical force seizure that it was not free to reject in
favor of the "opposite understanding" espoused by other circuits that con-
tinuing seizure is inconsistent with Hodari.140 Further, the district court
noted that Brown was decided after a number of such contrary circuit deci-
sions and, therefore, it was reasonable to assume that the Third Circuit was
cognizant of opposing interpretations. 14 1 As further evidence of the
Third Circuit's awareness of contrary holdings in other circuits, the district
court cited the 2009 Third Circuit opinion United States v. Smith,"42 where
the court again endorsed and clarified its continuing seizure standard.' 4 3
In Smith, the defendant argued that he complied with police officers' show
of authority-and therefore was seized-when he took two steps toward
the officers' vehicle in response to their request that he place his hands on
the patrol car. 144 After his momentary submission, the defendant immedi-
ance. See id. (examining application of show of authority seizure standard in Valen-
tine to explain standard's parameters). For further discussion of how the Third
Circuit's definition of show of authority seizure and the Third Circuit's application
of it in future cases evidence the court's adoption of the concept of continuing
seizure, see infra notes 14047 and accompanying text.
140. See Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *8-11 (concluding that al-
though application of physical force seizure language in Brown is dicta, "this Court
does not consider itself free to disregard the clear definition of 'seizure' that Brown
provides, including as to circumstances of seizure through physical force, and to
adopt and apply instead the nearly opposite understanding, as relevant here, es-
poused by other circuits" and determining that "Brown means what it says, and ...
provides the operative definition of 'seizure,' whether through application of force
or show of authority, that [it] must apply").
141. See id. at *10 n.20 (recognizing that Brown holding was issued subsequent
to numerous cases rejecting continuing seizure, and concluding "[i]t is not unrea-
sonable to consider that the Third Circuit was cognizant of the positions on the
question adopted in other circuits at the time it decided Brown").
142. 575 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2009).
143. See Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *11 n.21 (noting that Brown
remains precedential in Third Circuit seizure cases); see also Smith, 575 F.3d at 314-
16 (reaffirming that seizure can occur solely through application of physical force
and relying on Brown to establish that individual who submits to show of authority
by more than "momentary compliance" is seized despite subsequent flight).
144. See Smith, 575 F.3d at 311-12 (describing facts and procedural posture of
case). In Smith, the defendant was stopped by police who were patrolling in a
"high crime" area and were instructed by their lieutenant to "'stop and identify
anyone that was out walking in the area'" to make the police presence known. See
id. at 311 (describing facts of case). The officers asked the defendant for identifi-
cation. See id. (same). When the defendant indicated that he did not have identifi-
cation with him, the officers inquired as to where the defendant was headed and
received only "I am heading to my girl's house" as the defendant's repeated re-
sponse. See id. (same). The officers repeatedly asked the defendant where "his
girl's house" was located, and when they received no reply, requested that the de-
fendant place his hands on the patrol car. See id. (same). The defendant re-
sponded by taking two steps toward the vehicle before fleeing. See id. (same). In
his motion to suppress the handgun he discarded during his subsequent flight
from the officers, the defendant argued that he was seized when he submitted to
the officers' show of authority by walking toward the vehicle. See id. at 311-12(describing procedural posture of case and noting that district court granted de-
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ately fled and discarded evidence. 145 The Third Circuit rejected the argu-
ment that the defendant's actions constituted the level of submission
necessary to effectuate a seizure.146 Rather, relying on its earlier decisions
in Coggins and Brown, the court held that a suspect is continually seized in
show of authority cases when "more than momentary compliance" pre-
cedes resistance.1 4 7 Thus, in view of the Third Circuit's endorsement of
continuing seizure in Smith and definition of physical force seizure in
Brown, the district court concluded in Dupree that although "discord exists
in the federal courts over this significant question of Fourth Amendment
law," there was no clear error of law.148 Accordingly, the court held that
Dupree was seized when he was first grabbed, and reaffirmed its earlier
order granting Dupree's motion to suppress.14 9
V. DUPREE RESISTS THE SUPREME COURT'S "SHOW OF
AUTHORITY' IN HODARY
In Dupree, the district court granted the motion to suppress based on
its conclusions-derived primarily from the Third Circuit's interpretation
of Hodari in Brown-that: (1) a suspect who is touched by a law enforce-
ment officer or momentarily submits to a show of authority prior to resis-
tance or flight is continually seized during the entire course of the
encounter, and (2) in this scenario, evidence discarded during flight is
inadmissible unless the officer possessed reasonable suspicion at the out-
set.150 These conclusions arguably support the individual rights protec-
fendant's motion to suppress because reasonable suspicion was not present during
initial encounter).
145. See id. at 311 (describing facts of case). After taking two steps toward the
patrol car, the defendant fled when the officers opened their car doors. See id.
(same). The officers then pursued the defendant on foot through a parking lot
and witnessed him drop the handgun at issue in the case. See id. (same).
146. See id. at 315-16 (noting that show of authority seizure requires "more
than momentary compliance" and concluding that, as compared to defendants in
Coggins and Brown, two steps toward police car by defendant here did not consti-
tute requisite level of compliance).
147. See id. (articulating Third Circuit standard for submission in show of au-
thority continuing seizure cases).
148. Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *9.
149. See id. at *8-11 (discussing Brown physical force seizure standard and con-
cluding that on these facts Dupree was seized when grabbed). Though the district
court concluded that Dupree was seized during his first encounter with the of-
ficers, it also recognized that "the facts of this case, involving a police officer's brief
and unsuccessful grasp of a citizen's arm, may place this matter near the outer
limits of the rule articulated in Brown." Id. at *10. Based on the standard of review
for clear error and Brown's reference to "the 'slightest application of physical
force,'" however, the court concluded that the seizure standard encompassed the
facts at issue and it could not adopt an alternative definition of seizure to the one
provided in Brown. See id. at *10-11 (describing rationale behind decision to sup-
press evidence against Dupree).
150. See id. at *6-11 (adopting Third Circuit seizure definition from Brown and
reasoning that Brown standard requires finding seizure even with ineffective appli-
cation of physical force, and concluding that evidence was inadmissible without
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tions underlying the exclusionary rule.'" They are also, however, difficult
to justify in view of Hodari and prevailing interpretations of that deci-
sion. 152 In light of these considerations, the Dupree decision, and by exten-
sion, the Third Circuit's interpretations of Hodari, are questionable and
should be given meaningful consideration on appeal. 5 3
A. Hodari and the Concept of Continuing Seizure
The district court in Dupree faithfully applied the Third Circuit's inter-
pretations of Hodari in Coggins and Brown and concluded that Dupree was
seized when the officer initially touched him.' 5 4 This conclusion was
based strictly on the Third Circuit's determination that Hodari defines
seizure by common law arrest standards.1 5 5 Viewing the Hodari opinion in
its entirety, however, it is evident that the court's interpretation was in fact
derived from a selective quoting of that decision.' 5 6 In particular, al-
though Hodari defined seizure by common law arrest standards, the Third
Circuit failed to recognize the Supreme Court's emphasis on submission
as a central component of that standard.15 7
reasonable suspicion at outset). In particular, the district court noted that Brown's
definition of seizure clearly encapsulates the instant case because "a 'seizure' oc-
curs for Fourth Amendment purposes when there is . . . '[a] laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately un-
successful."' Id. at *6 (quoting United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2006)). Based on this language, the court concluded that because Dupree was
touched by the officer at the outset of the encounter, he must have been seized at
that juncture despite the ineffectiveness of the officer's force. See id. (applying
Brown's definition of physical force seizure to facts of case).
151. For further discussion of policy arguments in favor of extending exclu-
sionary rule protections in the context of continuing seizure, see supra note 103
and accompanying text.
152. For further discussion of how Dupree fails to reflect the central holding
and policy arguments in Hodari, see infra notes 154-75 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the district court's application of Hodari in Dupree, as
well as recommendations regarding how the Third Circuit should rule on appeal,
see infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the district court's faithful application of the Coggins
and Brown seizure definition to the facts of Dupree's case, see supra notes 136-49
and accompanying text.
155. See Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *10-11 (noting that Third
Circuit derived its seizure definition by "expressly" relying on Hodanf's common law
arrest definitions of seizure and concluding it should apply Third Circuit's defini-
tion of physical force seizure to facts of Dupree).
156. For a discussion of the conflicting definitions of seizure provided by the
Court in Hodari, along with references to specific common law arrest seizure stan-
dards, see supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
157. See United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Hodan's common law arrest definitions of seizure but referencing neither Hodari's
conclusion that seizure does not occur unless suspect yields or its continuing
seizure hypothetical focusing on ultimate apprehension); see also United States v.
Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding Hodai's definition of
seizure requires submission but concluding that submission is strictly inter-
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Specifically, by focusing exclusively on common law arrest language,
the Third Circuit neglected to consider the implications of Hodal's cen-
tral holding, its hypothetical, or the policy argument pertaining to its
seizure definition.1 5 8 First, the Hodari opinion explicitly stated that a per-
son is not seized by physical force or a show of authority unless that indi-
vidual yields to the show of force or authority.1 59 Second, the parameters
of this holding were further articulated through the Court's hypothetical
wherein it determined that evidence discarded after a suspect breaks away
would not be the product of a continuing arrest.16 0 Finally, although it
did not directly address continuing seizure, the Court's policy argument in
Hodari is nevertheless instructive in this context as well.' 61 The Court re-
jected the notion that the exclusionary rule can be applied to situations in
which the suspect does not yield, and concluded that evidence should be
suppressed only in successful seizure scenarios.16 2
In view of these considerations, the majority of the circuit courts ad-
dressing the issue of continuing seizure have concluded that such a con-
cept is inconsistent with Hodari.s6 3 Although the Third Circuit in Brown
and Coggins seemingly endorsed continuing seizure, those cases involved
suspects exhibiting more than momentary compliance prior to flight.164
Nevertheless, even if the court has not squarely encountered a momentary
compliance case, the court's definition of physical force seizure indicates
preted-rendering individuals seized for Fourth Amendment purposes even dur-
ing momentary submission).
158. For a discussion of Dupree's inconsistency with the central holding and
policy arguments articulated in Hodari, see infra notes 169-75 and accompanying
text.
159. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (stating question
presented as "whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to appli-
cation of physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield"
and concluding it does not).
160. See id. at 625 (providing hypothetical based on current facts to articulate
that "[a] seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact" and rejecting notion of
continuing arrest during "period of fugitivity" even if arrestee is touched (quoting
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 471 (1874))). For further discus-
sion of the continuing seizure hypothetical presented in Hodari, see supra notes 74-
76 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of how Hodari's policy argument is instructive in evaluat-
ing whether the Court accepted or rejected the concept of continuing seizure, see
infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
162. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624-27 (reasoning from common law arrest stan-
dards). For a discussion of the policy argument embraced by the Supreme Court
in Hodari and its implications for the exclusionary rule, see infra notes 169-75 and
accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of circuit court decisions rejecting the concept of con-
tinuing seizure and an examination of the rationales asserted by those courts, see
supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the factual scenarios in Coggins and Brown and an
examination of the Third Circuit's holdings in those decisions, see supra notes 110-
16, 138-43, and accompanying text.
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that it would recognize continuing seizure in such a case.1 6 5 Indeed, this
is precisely what the district court concluded in Dupree when it held, based
on Third Circuit precedent, that Dupree was seized when the officer
grabbed him for those first two seconds. 6 6 Although Hodari supports this
conclusion in selectively quoted passages, the entirety of the opinion and
its factually similar hypothetical indicate the Court's rejection of the con-
cept of continuing seizure. 167 Accordingly, Dupree is difficult to justify in
light of Hodari.168
B. The Policy Implications of Continuing Seizure
Both Brown and Dupree fail to expressly address the policy implications
implicit in recognizing the continuing seizure concept.' 69 To adequately
evaluate Dupree in light of Fourth Amendment precedent, it is necessary to
compare the policy implications of the decision with the policy arguments
articulated by the Court in Hodari. In practice, Dupree would render evi-
dence discarded during flight inadmissible and extend exclusionary rule
protections to the entire course of the encounter-even if the defendant
flees and the seizure is ultimately unsuccessful.1 7 0 Hodari, however, specif-
ically rebutted such an approach.1 7 1 In particular, Hodari concluded that
exclusionary rule protections should only be applied to situations where a
165. See United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding
that defendant was seized upon submission to police authority, but noting that
substantial time had elapsed between officer informing defendant he was not free
to leave and defendant's subsequent resistance); United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d
651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding suspect was seized by initial compliance with
show of authority even though suspect eventually ran from police, but recognizing
that suspect was detained for brief period before flight); cf Brown, 448 F.3d at 245(defining seizure as occurring upon application of physical force regardless of its
ineffectiveness and thus concluding continuing seizure is legally valid based on
definition providing for seizure despite flight).
166. See United States v. Dupree, Crim. No. 08-280, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68127, at *8-11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009) (discussing Brown physical force seizure
standard and concluding that on these facts Dupree was seized when grabbed).
For further discussion of the court's reasoning, see supra notes 129-50 and accom-
panying text.
167. For an analysis of Dupree's inconsistency with the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Hodari, see supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of the district court's application of the Hodari seizure
standard in Dupree and an examination of Dupree's inconsistency with Fourth
Amendment precedent, see supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
169. See Dupree, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68127, at *7-11 (establishing that based
on Third Circuit precedent and its interpretation of Hodari, continuing seizure is
valid concept, but neglecting to address policy considerations); see also Brown, 448
F.3d at 245-46 (deriving physical force seizure definition from Hodari's common
law arrest standard discussion, but failing to cite or reference policy concerns).
170. For further discussion of the evidentiary ramifications resulting from the
concept of continuing seizure, see supra notes 16-24, 87-116, and accompanying
text.
171. For a discussion of Hodari's policy rationale for its seizure standard, see
infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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suspect yields to law enforcement authority.172 The Court noted that po-
lice orders to stop are generally legitimate and compliance with such or-
ders should be encouraged in the interest of public safety. 173 Moreover,
the Court reasoned that because police "do not command 'Stop!' expect-
ing to be ignored, or give chase hoping to be outrun," the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule should apply to "genuine, successful seizures."1 74
Based on this policy rationale, Dupree's extension of the exclusionary rule
to evidence obtained during a continuing seizure, and the Third Circuit's
endorsement of this position, is inconsistent with Hodari.175
VI. CONCLUSION
The district court's adoption of the continuing seizure concept in Du-
pree is consistent with the common law arrest definition of seizure, but
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Hodari and Fourth
Amendment case law.17 6 Although the Third Circuit defined physical
force seizure in Brown, it has not provided such definition in a preceden-
tial opinion.1 77 The appeal of Dupree, therefore, will provide the Third
Circuit with a first impression case directly addressing the issue of what
constitutes physical force seizure, as well as allow the court to rule on the
concept of continuing seizure.17 8 If the Third Circuit adheres to the inter-
pretation of Hodari that it pronounced in Brown-and accordingly en-
dorses continuing seizure-its decision will further cement the circuit split
and will contribute to greater inconsistency in federal courts' application
of the exclusionary rule in seizure cases. 179 This holding would
strengthen Fourth Amendment individual rights through greater exclu-
172. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627 (1991) (clarifying that de-
spite adoption of new seizure standard, exclusionary rule protections should not
be extended to unsuccessful seizures).
173. See id. ("Only a few [police orders to stop], we must presume, will be
without adequate basis, and since the addressee has no ready means of identifying
the deficient ones it almost invariably is the reasonable course to comply.").
174. Id.
175. For a discussion of Dupree's inconsistency with the policy argument set
forth in Hodari, and for a comparative analysis of Dupree's policy implications with
Hodari's policy objectives, see supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of Dupree's reliance on the Third Circuit's adoption of
the Hodari common law arrest definition of seizure, and a comparison of these
isolated definitions with the entirety of the Hodari holding, see supra notes 154-68
and accompanying text.
177. See United States v. Dupree, Crim. No. 08-280, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68127, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009) (noting Third Circuit's physical force seizure
definition was in dicta, and stipulating that there are no precedential Third Circuit
decisions on dispositive issue in Dupree).
178. For a discussion of the impact of Dupree, see infra notes 179-85 and ac-
companying text.
179. For a discussion of circuit court cases opposing the concept of continu-
ing seizure and an overview of the evidentiary ramifications surrounding the con-
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sionary rule protections, but at the expense of efficient law enforce-
ment.18 0 Officers who view suspicious behavior but lack the adequate
level of suspicion to seize an individual may refrain from initiating a Terry
stop at the expense of public safety due to evidentiary concerns.18 1 This
result would be inconsistent with both the policy rationale articulated in
Hodari, as well as the Supreme Court's emphasis on law enforcement effi-
ciency in Terry.18 2
Conversely, rejecting continuing seizure would lead to greater con-
tinuity in federal courts' application of the exclusionary rule.1 83 Arguably,
this result could weaken individual rights protections by encouraging po-
lice officers to pursue suspects on less than reasonable suspicion. 184 How-
ever, the Supreme Court established in Hodari that it believed such
instances of police abuse would be few and, in any event, did not super-
sede the need for efficient law enforcement.' 8 5 Therefore, a Third Circuit
holding that continuing seizure is invalid would support Hodari's policy
rationale.186
It is clear that Hodari evidences internal inconsistency that has led
federal courts to reach opposite conclusions as to whether continuing
180. For a discussion of the manner in which Dupree would potentially impact
evidentiary rights by extending exclusionary rule protections, see supra notes 16-
24, 87-116, and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the policy implications implicit in extending the pro-
tections of the exclusionary rule, see supra notes 24, 40-42, and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of the policy rationale underlying the Supreme Court's
decision to extend constitutional seizures in Terry, see supra notes 37-42 and ac-
companying text.
183. For a survey of federal circuit courts accepting and rejecting the concept
of continuing seizure, see supra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
184. See United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 573 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting
concept of continuing seizure, but nevertheless expressing policy concerns about
decision). Specifically, the court noted:
A substantial argument could be made that a broader definition of
"seizure"-or some other remedy-is required to adequately protect
Fourth Amendment values from harms flowing from police initiation of
Terry stops without reasonable suspicion. Although the Hodari Court
stated that "only a few of those orders [to stop], we must presume, will be
without adequate basis," the possibility that unreasonable orders are in-
frequent does not necessarily make them acceptable. Even if the kind of
order given in Swindle's case is rare-and we do not suggest that it is-we
see no persuasive reason for the law to tolerate it. In view of what we
believe to be the controlling case, however, we must affirm a conviction
that was achieved with evidence obtained by an abuse of police power. A
remedy for Swindle's Fourth Amendment complaint can come only from
a higher authority.
Id. (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627 (1991)).
185. For a discussion of Hodari's policy rationale with respect to limiting ex-
pansion of exclusionary rule protections, see supra notes 169-75 and accompanying
text.
186. For a discussion of how the district court's holding in Dupree is inconsis-
tent with the policy concerns articulated in Hodari, see supra notes 169-75 and ac-
companying text.
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seizure is a valid legal concept.1 8 7 It is equally clear, however, that the
majority of circuit courts reject the concept of continuing seizure.18 8 To
resolve the current circuit split and provide uniformity in federal courts'
application of the exclusionary rule in this context, clearer guidance from
the Supreme Court is needed.1 89 In the interim, however, circuit courts
should apply Hodari in a manner most consistent with its central holding
and policy concern. 190 At present, the Third Circuit can meet this task by
rejecting the continuing seizure concept and reversing the district court's
holding in Dupree.'9 1
Darby G. Sullivan
187. For a discussion of Hodari's internal inconsistency with respect to its
seizure standard and the circuit split that has resulted from this ambiguity, see
supra notes 71-116 and accompanying text.
188. For a survey of federal circuit courts rejecting the concept of continuing
seizure, see supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Paradis, supra note 56, at 332 (explaining that Hodari was based
not on precedent but on "nineteenth-century treatises and cases discussing the
common law of arrest" and concluding that Supreme Court needs to remedy cur-
rent confusion regarding Hodar's seizure standard).
190. See United States v. Dupree, Crim. No. 08-280, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68127, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009) (recognizing that Hodari is still valid law and
must be followed in seizure cases). For a discussion of how the district court's
holding in Dupree is inconsistent with Hodari and Fourth Amendment case law gen-
erally, see supra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.
191. For a discussion of Dupree's-and by extension, the Third Circuit's-in-
consistency with Hodari, see supra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.
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